We study experimentally in the laboratory two 2-player games that mimic a decentralized decision-making situation in which firms repeatedly outsource production orders to multiple identical suppliers. The first game has a unique (inefficient) equilibrium in mixed strategies, while the second game has two (efficient) equilibria in pure strategies and an infinite number of (inefficient) equilibria in mixed strategies. In both games, the optimal social costs can also be obtained via dominated strategies. We find that only in the second game subjects manage to reach an efficient outcome more often when matched in fixed pairs than when randomly rematched each round. Surprisingly, this is because subjects coordinate on dominated strategies (and not an efficient pure strategy equilibrium). We show theoretically that preferences for efficiency cannot explain our experimental results. Inequality aversion, on the other hand, cannot be rejected.
Introduction
In the last decade, outsourcing has become increasingly important as advanced products are typically no longer completely built in-house. Hence, apart from managing their own production facilities, companies have an increasing need to tightly control outsourced operations. In this paper, we report on a laboratory experiment that deals with a stylized model of decentralized decision-making situations in which companies outsource production orders or jobs to multiple identical suppliers. We assume that each company can only freely decide to which supplier it outsources each of its jobs. In particular, outsourcing companies cannot decide on the order in which each supplier processes the received jobs. This assumption reflects the fact that most transactions in supply chains are governed by price-only contracts. A drawback of these contracts is that they do not coordinate the supply chain. That is, locally optimal decisions may lead to a joint outcome that can be improved upon (see, e.g., Perakis and Roels, 2007) . We consider the well-known shortest-first policy (i.e., Smith's (1956) rule) where each supplier processes jobs optimally by placing them in order of increasing processing time.
We assume that each outsourcing company is selfishly interested in minimizing the sum of completion times of its jobs. This may reflect for instance the fact that different jobs of the same outsourcing company are part of different final products, all of which the company aims to produce and sell as soon as possible. Thus, individual agents interact to make decisions that affect them collectively. The results of imply that this strategic interaction needs not lead to socially optimal schedules. In fact, there is no centralized mechanism that implements socially optimal schedules in Nash equilibrium. In a related study, Braat et al. (2015) provided a tight bound for the price of anarchy, i.e., the ratio between the social costs in the worst Nash equilibrium and the optimal social costs. Their theoretical results and simulations suggest that it is hard to coordinate outsourcing decisions in such a way that social costs are relatively small.
Objective
Our laboratory experiment aims to complement the above results by determining to which extent and under which conditions coordination failures occur or are less likely to occur. Most of the literature that studies coordination mechanisms for supply chains and competitive scheduling environments considers one-shot games (for a review see e.g. Li and Wang, 2007) . In practice, however, firms usually compete repeatedly in market situations facing the same or possibly different competitors. In particular, this raises the question whether and to which extent there is a difference (in terms of costs, individual behavior, etc.) between outsourcing problems in which firms face the same competitors and outsourcing problems in which firms face possibly different competitors in each period.
Laboratory experiment in a nutshell
We carry out a laboratory experiment that mimics a stylized outsourcing problem with 2 players and 2 identical suppliers (the latter will be referred to as "machines"). There are 4 jobs denoted by A, B, C, and D which only differ in their processing times: p A < p B < p C < p D . Each player owns exactly 2 jobs. We study the two arguably most interesting stage games. In one stage game ("AC") some player owns jobs A and C, and in the other stage game ("AD") some player owns jobs A and D. In each session, each of the two stage games is repeatedly played during twenty rounds.
We use two different matching mechanisms. In the so-called Partner treatment each subject has a fixed opponent during all twenty rounds, while in the so-called Random treatment in each round each subject is randomly matched to some (possibly distinct) opponent.
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From a game-theoretical perspective the stage games are such that it is never worthwhile for players to send both jobs to the same machine. This leaves the players with two undominated strategies. Then, it is easy to see that both games have strong coordination effects. For instance, if one player sends her shortest job to one machine, the other player has incentives to send her shortest job to the other machine. The two games differ because in game AC there is a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies, while in game AD there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria that sustain the optimal social costs and a continuum of mixed strategy Nash equilibria with higher social costs. Finally, in both games the optimal social costs can also be implemented via strategy profiles that consist of dominated strategies.
Main findings
Our findings are as follows. First, even though our setting is based on possibly the simplest 1 Obviously, since the outsourcing problem has a very simple structure, our study should be regarded as a first step in a full-fledged analysis. Indeed, the advantage of its simplicity is that future experimental studies can incorporate more complex real-life features and then more easily determine how these additional features affect behavior and outcomes.
non-trivial outsourcing situation, we observe a non-negligible play of dominated strategies in both treatments which slightly diminishes over time. This behavior can partly be justified for game AD in treatment Partner, as some groups manage to reach repeatedly the optimal social costs via these decisions. Second, subjects coordinate more often -that is, the optimal social costs are obtained with a higher frequency-if they are matched in fixed pairs than under a random matching only in game AD. But this is not because subjects play in treatment Partner a socially optimal pure strategy equilibrium and in treatment Random a socially non-optimal mixed strategy equilibrium (as one might guess): surprisingly the aforementioned coordination on a socially optimal dominated strategy profile is the driving factor of this finding. In game AC, on the other hand, the degree of coordination in treatment Partner is the same as in treatment Random. Third, for both games, the two treatments present the same average social costs. Finally, since our results stand in contrast with expected payoff maximization, we study theoretically the effect of "social preferences" in games AC and AD. We show that preferences for efficiency cannot explain our experimental results as these preferences induce the same equilibrium structure in the two games. Inequality aversion, on the other hand, constitutes a possible explanation since (efficient) dominated strategy profiles can be sustained in equilibrium in game AD but not in game AC.
Related experimental literature
Apart from the theoretical literature mentioned earlier, there is a large number of related laboratory experiments on coordination games. For example, Cooper et al. (1989) show that in the "Battle of the Sexes Game" (where subjects have opposing preferences over the set of pure strategy equilibria) coordination cannot be established in the long run. However, if one player communicates the strategy she is going to follow in a non-binding way, then the degree of coordination improves significantly. If the game has multiple Pareto-rankable equilibria in pure strategies, i.e., the "Stag-Hunt Game," Cooper et al. (1990 Cooper et al. ( ,1992 find that subjects end up in the inefficient equilibrium and that the presence of dominated strategies is not inconsequential (as we do). Clark and Sefton (2001) complement these works by showing that playing the game in fixed pairs helps subjects coordinating on the efficient outcome. Also, according to Brandts and Cooper (2006) and Brandts et al. (2007) it is possible to move away from the bad equilibrium if one player sticks to her part of the good equilibrium, hoping that the other player changes beliefs. Along this line, Terracol and Vaksmann (2009) , Danz et al. (2012) , and Hyndman et al. (2012) identify players who willingly forego immediate payoffs in order to be able to coordinate later on a better equilibrium. More recently, Hyndman et al. (2014) find that in a game with strategic complementarities a fixed matching leads to higher payoff variability. Our study is different in that the pure strategy equilibria in game AD are not Pareto rankable and that game AC has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies. Therefore, we cannot expect such a teaching effect. Finally, experiments on coordination games typically do not involve dominated strategies. Our study thus allows to analyze if and how the presence of dominated strategies and the presence of pure strategy equilibria that sustain the optimal social costs (i.e., a comparison between game AC and game AD) affect play and the degree of coordination.
Experiment

The outsourcing problem
Below we describe the particular outsourcing problem that we experimentally study. We refer to for a description of a general class of outsourcing problems and associated games. There is a set of four jobs {A, B, C, D} that are to be processed on either of two identical machines M 1 and M 2 . The only difference between the jobs is their processing time, i.e., the time needed to process a given job on any machine. Specifically, the processing times of the jobs are given by (p A , p B , p C , p D ) = (10, 20, 50, 60) . If a machine has to process more than one job, it will process jobs sequentially, i.e., one after the other, and without idle time. It is assumed that if a machine is to process a set of jobs it will do so in order of increasing processing time, i.e., each machine employs the so-called shortest-first policy. Smith (1956) showed that the shortest-first policy is optimal for each individual machine in the sense that it minimizes the sum of completion times of the assigned jobs. The completion time of a job is the sum of processing times of its predecessors and its own processing time.
There are two players, player 1 and player 2, each of whom will own exactly two of the four jobs (the precise assignment of the jobs to players varies in the experiment and is discussed later).
The players simultaneously choose an allocation of their jobs to the two machines. More precisely, each player chooses one of the four allocations which we denote by a(1, 1), a(1, 2), a(2, 1), and a(2, 2). Here, a(x, y) denotes the allocation in which the job with the shorter processing time is sent to machine M x and the other job is sent to machine M y . The costs associated with a job are given by its completion time. Each player aims to minimize the sum of the costs of his two jobs.
Given a specification of the ownership of the jobs, the above situation straightforwardly induces a non-cooperative game of complete information, which is explained next in more detail.
Possibly the most interesting (and least trivial) scenario is one in which neither of the players has the two shortest jobs.
2 In our stylized setting this means that none of the players owns jobs A and B. More precisely, we consider two specifications of the ownership of the jobs. In the first specification, denoted by AC, player 1 owns jobs A and C and player 2 owns the other jobs, i.e., B and D. In the second specification, denoted by AD, player 1 owns jobs A and D and player 2 owns the other jobs, i.e., B and C. Before we describe the two induced games we define the social costs (associated with a profiles of allocations) as the sum of costs of processing the four jobs. It is easy to verify that the minimal sum of costs of processing the four jobs is 170 in both games.
These optimal social costs are obtained as long as job A is processed only with either job C or job
(Due to symmetry with respect to M 1 and M 2 , there will be four profiles of decisions in which the social costs are minimized.)
Game AC Table 1 gives the costs for each player in each combination of allocation decisions in game AC. (1, 2) . Moreover, Table 1 shows that there is no Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Using standard arguments from game theory it also follows that there is a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies where each player chooses each of a(1, 2)
and a(2, 1) with probability 1 2 . The associated costs are 1 2 (60 + 80, 90 + 140) = (70, 115). Hence, the social costs in equilibrium (185) are 8.8% higher than the optimal social costs (170). Table 2 gives the costs for each player in each combination of allocation decisions in game AD. It follows from Table 2 that for either player a(1, 1) is dominated by a(2, 1) and a(2, 2) is dominated by a(1, 2). Table 2 also shows that there are two Nash equilibria that induce optimal social costs, namely the two profiles in which one player chooses a(1, 2) and the other player chooses a(2, 1). Obviously, these are the best possible Nash equilibria (in terms of social costs).
Game AD
However, there are (many) other Nash equilibria in mixed strategies, namely player 2 chooses each of a(1, 2) and a(2, 1) with probability 1 2 and player 1 assigns strictly positive probability to a(1, 2) and a(2, 1) only. The costs associated with any of these mixed strategy equilibria are 1 2 (90 + 120, 80 + 80) = (105, 80). Hence, the worst social costs in equilibrium (185) are 8.8% higher than the optimal social costs (170). Observe that the social costs of all mixed strategy equilibria in game AD are equal to the social costs of the unique mixed strategy equilibrium in game AC.
Procedures
The experiment was programmed within the z-Tree toolbox provided by Fischbacher (2007) and carried out in the computer laboratory at a local university. In total, 120 undergraduates from various disciplines participated in the experiment.
In each of the two sessions (one per treatment), both games AC and AD were played twenty times. In half of the sessions the batch of twenty AC games was played before the batch of twenty AD games. In the other half of the sessions, the order was reversed. More importantly, we introduced two treatments. First, subjects were randomly split into two groups, say G 1 and G 2 , of equal size. More precisely, |G 1 | = |G 2 | = 15. Subjects did not know who belonged to which group. In one treatment (Partner), for each batch of games, each subject from group G i was matched (anonymously and randomly) to a fixed partner in group G j , j = i. In other words, each subject most likely played against two different subjects (from the other group) over the entire experiment. In the other treatment (Random), for each of the forty games, each subject from group G i was anonymously and randomly matched to a subject from group G j , j = i.
At the beginning of the experiment the subjects received a detailed description of the outsourcing problem and the game that was played in the first batch of twenty games with several examples (Appendix A). The only difference between the instructions of the two different treatments was the final page. In that final page we explained the partition of the subjects into the two groups (and how these groups were used to match subjects with one another throughout the experiment) and the existence of two batches of twenty games. In particular, subjects knew that after the first batch of games they would play a second different batch of games (without knowing beforehand the precise difference). In other words, the specific details of the second batch of games were explained only after the first batch of games had been played.
Each subject was initially endowed with 5200 ECU. The costs of a subject's two jobs in each game were subtracted from his endowment. Each ECU of the final wealth (i.e., after the fortieth game) was worth 0.008 Euros. After each of the forty games each subject received a summary of his last decision, the decision of the partner in that game, the induced costs (accompanied by an explanatory graph of the induced schedule), and his updated endowment. No further feedback was provided during the entire experiment. Subjects had the opportunity to ask questions regarding the working of the games during the entire experiment.
A typical session lasted about 90 minutes and subjects earned on average 15.06 Euro (including a 3 Euro show-up fee) for their participation.
Results
We formulate three hypotheses and present our findings. The first hypothesis is based on a rationality assumption. As mentioned in the analysis of the stage games AC and AD, a(1, 1) and a(2, 2) are dominated strategies. Since the stage games are finitely repeated in our experiment,
by backward induction, players should never use dominated strategies. Consequently, we expect a minimally rational agent to choose a(1, 1) and a(2, 2) less often over time.
Hypothesis 1: Dominated allocations are played less often over time. is a non-negligible proportion (5.7% to 9.7%) of either of the two irrational allocations -a(1, 1) and a(2, 2)-, independently of the order in which the two games (game AC and game AD) are played. A similar observation holds for treatment Partner (two bottom rows). The χ 2 tests of homogeneity displayed in Table 3 also reveal that the game played -i.e., AC or AD-and the order in which the (two batches of twenty) games are played -i.e., AC first or AD first-, which are the two variables that are subject to within treatments variations, affect behavior only mildly. In fact, only one of the eight comparisons is significant at the five percent level. In order to explore whether subjects need time to understand the precise working of the games, we present in Figure 1 the frequencies of allocations in both treatments and games without taking into account the order in which games are played. Typically, a(1, 2) and a(2, 1) are played more often over time. More importantly though, for a given game (AC or AD), there do not seem to exist important treatment differences. Next, we analyze individual behavior to shed more light on Hypothesis 1 that subjects play dominated allocations less often over time. With respect to game AC we find that out of the 60 subjects who participated in each treatment, 21 subjects in treatment Random and 10 subjects in treatment Partner never choose an allocation that is dominated in the stage game. Out of the 38 subjects in treatment Random and the 43 subjects in treatment Partner who use a dominated allocation at least once in the first ten rounds, 39.5% (15 out of 38 subjects) in treatment Random and 32.6% (14 out of 43 subjects) in treatment Partner avoid dominated allocation in the last ten rounds. Moreover, 1 subject in treatment Random and 7 subjects in treatment Partner never play a dominated allocation in the first ten rounds but do experiment with them at least once in the last ten rounds. On the basis of this data we then obtain by means of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests that fewer subjects play dominated allocations in the last ten rounds than in the first ten rounds in treatment Random (two-sided p = 0.0051) but not in treatment Partner (two-sided
If we look at the whole batch of twenty rounds in game AD, 6 subjects in treatment Random and 10 subjects in treatment Partner never choose dominated allocations. The breakdown in two phases of ten rounds in game AD for treatment Random is given by 11 in the first ten rounds and 30 in the last ten rounds, while the breakdown for treatment Partner is is 14 in the first ten rounds and 29 in the last ten rounds. Since the differences between the two phases are significant in both treatments (two-sided p=0.0004 in Random and two-sided p=0.0019 in Partner), we conclude that more subjects avoid the play of dominated allocations in game AD over time.
Result 1: A non-negligible proportion of decisions involve players choosing dominated allocations. This irrational behavior slightly fades away over time.
Our second hypothesis regards the degree of coordination. Formally, we say that coordination is achieved if the sum of social costs is minimized. It can be seen from Tables 1 and 2 that in both games social costs are minimized for the four allocation profiles that are on the bottom-left/top-right diagonal of the cost matrices. For this reason we refer from now on to the allocation profiles (a(1, 1), a(2, 2)) and (a(2, 2), a(1, 1)) as exterior profiles and to the allocation profiles (a(1, 2), a(2, 1)) and (a(2, 1), a(1, 2)) as interior profiles. We next discuss our predictions for each game separately.
Game AC has a unique equilibrium in mixed strategies with a probability of coordination of 0.5 that stems entirely from interior profiles. But also observe that the costs of player 2 associated with the exterior profiles are equal to 100, which is less than the costs associated with the mixed strategy equilibrium (115). Moreover, player 1 is indifferent between any of the exterior profiles and the mixed strategy equilibrium (costs are 70) and therefore, no player is worse off at the exterior profiles in comparison to the mixed strategy equilibrium. Since it is not clear how players can coordinate on the exterior profiles in treatment Random, our prediction is that the mixed strategy equilibrium prevails in that treatment. In treatment Partner one cannot disregard the possibility that some groups manage to coordinate on the exterior profiles as this joint deviation from the mixed strategy equilibrium does not hurt either player, which should raise the frequency of coordination in comparison to treatment Random.
Game AD has two pure strategy equilibria each of which has a probability of coordination of 1 (on interior profiles), and a continuum of other mixed strategy equilibria each of which has a probability of coordination of 0.5 (also on interior profiles). With respect to the exterior profiles, observe that the lowest costs player 2 can achieve from choosing a dominated allocation are 90, yet costs are 80 for sure when she chooses a(1, 2) or a(2, 1). Therefore, it is not jointly profitable to move from any equilibrium to the exterior profiles. Hence, there should be no coordination on exterior profiles. In treatment Random, we hypothesize that player 2 follows the prediction of (all) mixed strategy equilibria and plays both a(1, 2) and a(2, 1) with probability 0.5, so that the frequency of coordination is 0.5 independently of the equilibrium strategy played by player 1.
Then, since having a fixed partner should make it possible to coordinate to some extent on either of the two pure strategy equilibria (instead of playing the mixed strategy equilibrium), we expect more coordination on interior profiles in treatment Partner than in treatment Random. Hypothesis 2 can be statistically tested with the help of a random effects estimation on the different frequencies of coordination. Since the results of this estimation (presented in Table 5) imply that the two-sided p-value of the χ 2 test that β 2 +β 4 = 0 is equal to 0.1791 in the first, 0.8067 in the second, and 0.1576 in the last column, there are no differences between game AC and game AD in treatment Random. The associated overall frequency of coordination is obviously lower than the point prediction of 0.5 (β 0 + β 3 = 0.3724), because Hypothesis 2 assumes ideally that subjects do not play dominated strategies, which contrasts with Result 1. Still, the play of dominated allocations in treatment Random should be considered pure noise. 3 With respect to the hypothesis that treatment Partner facilitates coordination, we find that β 3 is significantly smaller than zero in the last two columns. Hence, in game AD there is overall more coordination in treatment Partner than in treatment Random (as predicted). This is because there is more coordination on exterior profiles in treatment Partner and because there are no treatment differences with respect to the coordination on interior profiles (contrary to Hypothesis 2). Lastly, the two-sided p-values of the χ 2 tests that β 3 + β 4 = 0 are equal to 0.5018 (first), 0.0142 (second), and 0.1345 (last column).
Thus, for game AC there are no treatment differences with respect to the coordination on interior profiles and treatment Partner facilitates coordination on exterior profiles (as predicted). Yet, the latter effect is not large enough to find an overall effect (contrary to Hypothesis 2). Table 5 : Random effects estimations on the frequency of coordination on interior and exterior profiles, and the sum of the two (overall) at the subject level. We control for the order in which games are played. * * * indicates significance at p = 0.001, * * at p = 0.01, and * at p = 0.05 (all two-sided).
Finally, to shed more light on the capacity to coordinate in treatment Partner, we depict in Figure 3 the costs over time at the group (i.e., pair) level. In particular, we wish to analyze how many of the groups manage to converge to a stable play that leads to the optimal social costs. Of the 30 groups that participated in treatment Partner, groups 1-15 faced game AC first and groups 16-30 faced game AD first. Also note that the costs per subject in a group are 85 if one player chooses a(1, 2) and the other player a(2, 1), while costs are 100 if both players choose the same allocation a (1, 2) or a(2, 1) . Consequently, one sign for the play of a mixed strategy equilibrium is that we observe alterations of costs per subject of 85 and 100 over time. Also, according to Hypothesis 2, convergence to the optimal social costs through interior profiles should be more difficult in game AC than in game AD, while convergence on exterior profiles should only be possible for game AC. Figure 3 reveals that several groups manage to coordinate on the optimal social costs over time in game AD. For example, in the last ten rounds of this game, a total of 9 groups (groups 1, 7, 8, 12, 17, 21, 24, 26, 29) reach at least 8 times the optimal social costs via the same play.
Out of these 9 groups, groups 12, 17, and 24 coordinate on exterior profiles, the other 6 groups on interior profiles. We find that only 4 groups (groups 12, 17, 21, and 22) manage to reach the optimal social costs 8 times during the last 10 rounds in game AC via the same play. All these groups coordinate on interior profiles.
Result 2:
The frequency of coordination in treatment Random is the same for both games. . Thus, the costs do not seem to depend on the specific game played, which is in line with the aggregate behavior in Table 3 .
More formally, we use the results from the random effects estimation in Table 6 to show that the average social costs per player are the same in these four situations. To be more specific, Table   6 shows that both β 2 and β 3 are not significantly different from zero, so there is no difference between game AD and game AC in treatment Partner (β 2 ) and no difference between between game AD in treatment Partner and treatment Random (β 3 ). Also, there is no difference between 
0.0067
Observations 4800 Table 6 : Random effects estimations on the average social costs per player at the subject level. We control for the type of the player and the order in which games are played. * * * indicates significance at p = 0.001, * * indicates significance at p = 0.01, and * indicates significance at p = 0.05 (all two-sided).
game AD and game AC in treatment Random (β 2 + β 4 ) and between game AC in treatment
Partner and treatment Random (β 3 + β 4 ), as the two-sided p-value of the corresponding χ 2 tests are equal to 0.9978 in the former and 0.8691 in the latter case. Finally, with respect to the third part of Hypothesis 3, Table 6 hints at learning as the social costs decrease significantly over time as the play of dominated allocations reduces (Result 1) and coordination improves to some extent (see β 1 in the last column of Table 5 ). This effect is also visible in Figure 4 in all four panels. 
Concluding remarks
In this paper we have studied experimentally in the laboratory two 2-player stylized outsourcing problems. From a strategic point of view the difference between game AC and game AD is that in game AC there is a unique inefficient Nash equilibrium (in mixed strategies), while game AD has an infinite number of mixed strategy Nash equilibria (with the same social costs as the unique Nash equilibrium in game AC) and two efficient Nash equilibria in pure strategies. The optimal social costs can also be obtained in both games via the play of dominated strategies, yet there is another crucial difference between the two games in this respect: in game AC no player is worse off at such profile with respect to the unique Nash equilibrium, while in game AD there is no such joint profitable deviation from any Nash equilibrium. We have then been particularly interested in analyzing whether being matched in fixed pairs (treatment Partner) yields a better coordination (a higher frequency with which the optimal social costs are obtained) than a random matching (treatment Random).
Experimental insights
Since it is not clear how subjects could reach a socially optimal outcome in treatment Random, we expected subjects to randomize according to some mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in this treatment. And, in effect, if one disregards the 12%-15% play of dominated strategies -which is substantial but nevertheless pure noise since there are no signs that subjects manage to coordinate on the optimal social costs using these strategies-, this is what we have essentially found. Also, not surprisingly, none of the variables of interest (behavior, frequency of coordination, payoffs) has been significantly different between the two games in treatment Random.
Our main hypothesis has reflected the idea that subjects might be able to escape from the inefficient Nash equilibria when being matched in fixed pairs: in game AC because of coordination on a dominated strategy profile (no player is worse off with respect to the unique Nash equilibrium) and in game AD because of coordination on one of the two efficient pure strategy Nash equilibria (both players are strictly better off with respect to all Nash equilibria in mixed strategies). For game AC we indeed have found that subjects coordinate to some extent on dominated strategies in treatment Partner, but this effect is spurious (i.e., not maintained over time in a given pair) and marginal (i.e., not strong enough to obtain a higher overall frequency of coordination in comparison to treatment Random). Also, it has become clear that the presence of dominated strategies in game AD is not inconsequential (contrary to what we have expected). The overall frequency of coordination in this game has turned out to be higher in treatment Partner than in treatment Random, yet this is because several groups manage to coordinate over a long period of time on dominated strategies and not because they play an efficient Nash equilibrium.
Social preferences
Coordination on dominated strategies in game AD stands in contrast with expected payoff maximization. If one looks into the literature on "social preferences" that has suggested richer preference structures in order to explain the behavior of experimental subjects in a wide variety of games, preferences for efficiency and inequality aversion (see, among others, Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, and
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) come to mind. We next provide an equilibrium analysis of games AC and AD for these preference structures.
Let S = {a(1, 1), a(1, 2), a(2, 1), a(2, 2)} be the set of all possible strategies (for both players)
in the stage games AC and AD. We denote by s i ∈ S a generic strategy for player i = 1, 2. Also, s = (s 1 , s 2 ) ∈ S 2 is said to be a strategy profile. A utility function u i : S 2 → R for player i = 1, 2 assigns to all strategy profiles s ∈ S 2 a real number u i (s) ∈ R. If c i (s) is the costs player i incurs when profile s is played, then preferences for efficiency can be straightforwardly modeled by means of the utility function
One observes that i's objective is to minimize simultaneously her private and the social costs (with α > 0 denoting the trade-off between the two cost types). Table 7 shows the resulting utilities in game AD. Table 7 shows in boldface the strategy profiles that are a Nash equilibrium independently of the parameter α, i.e., for all α > 0. In particular, the interior profiles remain pure strategy Nash equilibria in game AD. This is not true for the exterior profiles: (a(1, 1), a(2, 2)) and (a(2, 2), a(1, 1)) Since these conditions are met if and only if α ≥ 1, preferences for efficiency would at first sight explain coordination on dominated strategies as an equilibrium phenomenon for these values of α.
However, if α ≥ 1 then (a(1, 1), a(2, 2)) and (a(2, 2), a(1, 1)) are also pure strategy Nash equilibria in game AC (see e.g. Table 8 for the case α = 1). In fact, the equilibrium structure of the two games is now the same, yet our experimental results in treatment Partner have shown that groups coordinate on exterior profiles in game AD but not in game AC. We will now show that our experimental results are consistent once we suppose that players are inequality averse and have the utility function
Here, α > 0 indicates the degree of inequality aversion of player i when player j = i gets the lower costs and β > 0 measures the inequality aversion of player i when player i gets the lower costs. The exterior profiles are equilibria in game AD if and only if (see Table 9 ) Table 9 : Utilities in game AD under inquality aversion (α > 0, β > 0).
We now complete our analysis by showing that the exterior profiles are never equilibria in game AC (see Table 10 ). The best response of player 2 against player 1's strategy a(1, 1) is to play a(1, 2), which gives her a utility of −90, and not to play a(2, 2), which gives her a utility of −100 − 30α. Similarly, the best response of player 2 against player 1's strategy a(2, 2) is a(2, 1). Consequently, coordination on dominated strategies can be obtained for inequality averse individuals in game AD but not in game AC. Table 10 : Utilities in game AC under inquality aversion (α > 0, β > 0).
Description
The situation in which this experiment takes place is the following. There are two players -let's call them player 1 and 2-. Each player has 2 jobs. So, there are 2x2 = 4 jobs -let's call them A, B, C and D-. We will specify later which of the jobs belong to player 1 and which ones belong to player 2. The jobs can be processed by any of two machines -let's call them M 1 and M 2 -which belong to two different owners/entrepreneurs. The two machines are identical. In other words, each machine take the same amount of time to process any given job. The particular "processing time" (i.e., duration) of each job will be specified later.
Decision making:
Each player has to decide to which machine he wants to send each of his two jobs. The players make their decisions simultaneously. That is, none of the players knows the decision of the other player in advance.
Processing of the jobs:
When the two players have made their decisions, all jobs are immediately sent to the machines. For instance, if player 1 sends his two jobs to machine M 2 , then the owner of this machine receives these two jobs. (Depending on the decision of the other player, the owner of machine M 2 possibly receives more jobs.)
If the owner of a machine receives more than one job, then he will first process the job that is shortest among all jobs that have been assigned to him. When this job is finished, the second shortest job will be processed, etc., until all jobs that have been assigned to this owner are finished. In other words, each machine processes the jobs that have been assigned to it in the order of shortest to longest proceessing time.
Payoffs of the players:
When a machine completes a job, it is immediately returned and received by the corresponding player. So, the waiting time is exactly the time between the player's decision and him receiving the completed job. Waiting time is costly: each minute of waiting costs one ECU. For instance, if a player receives his completed job X after 50 minutes, then the player has lost 50 ECU. Hence, if a player wants to minimize the costs incurred by any of his jobs, then he should try to obtain a small waiting time.
The final payoff of a player equals his initial wealth minus the sum of the waiting times of any of his jobs.
Examples
We will now illustrate the previously described situation through four examples. We assume that the initial wealth of each player is 150 ECU. We also assume that the processing times (duration) of the jobs are as follows:
• the processing time of job A is 10 (minutes);
• the processing time of job B is 20 (minutes);
• the processing time of job C is 50 (minutes);
• the processing time of job D is 60 (minutes).
Recall that the two machines are identical. That is, the two machines need the same time to process any given job. For instance, processing job C on either machine M 1 or M 2 requires 50 minutes.
First example.
In the first example we also suppose that
• jobs A and C belong to player 1;
• and that jobs B and D belong to player 2.
Decisions:
Suppose that player 1 sends his jobs (A and C) to machine M 1 . Suppose that player 2 sends his job B to machine M 1 and his job D to machine M 2 .
Processing:
Machine M 1 receives jobs A, B and C. Among these three jobs, A is the shortest job (10 minutes), B is the second shortest job (20 minutes) and C is the longest job (50 minutes). Hence, machine Second example.
Recall that the initial wealth of each player is 150 ECU. Recall that the processing times (duration) of the jobs are as follows:
We suppose again that
Decisions:
Suppose that player 1 sends his job A to machine M 1 and his job C to machine M 2 . Suppose that player 2 sends his jobs (B and D) to machine M 2 .
Processing:
Machine M Third example.
We now suppose that
• jobs A and D belong to player 1;
• and that jobs B and C belong to player 2.
Decisions:
Suppose that player 1 sends his job A to machine M 1 and his job D to machine M 2 . Suppose also that player 2 sends his jobs (B and C) to machine M 1 .
Processing:
Machine M 1 receives jobs A, B and C. Among these three jobs, A is the shortest job (10 minutes), B is the second shortest job (20 minutes) and C is the longest job (50 minutes). Hence, machines Fourth example.
Decisions:
Suppose that player 1 sends his job A to machine M 1 and his job D to machine M 2 . Suppose that player 2 sends his jobs (B and C) to machine M 2 .
Processing:
Machine 
The experiment
Each person that participates in the experiment is assigned an initial wealth of 5200 ECU. In total, you will play 40 times a game that is based on a situation like the ones that were described previously. In each of the 40 rounds you incur costs (which depend on your decisions and those of the other player). Each time we subtract these costs from your wealth. The wealth after the 40 rounds determines your monetary payment. Recall that each ECU is worth 0.008 Euros. Hence, if after the 40 rounds your wealth is x ECU, then you will obtain x 125
Euros (in addition to the 3 Euros for your participation).
Beginning
At the beginning of the experiment, the central computer will divide the participants in two groups. Each participant in the first group will have the role of player 1 and each participant in the second group will have the role of player 2. The division in two groups will be carried out randomly and anonymously. Hence, no participant will know who of the other participants belongs to which group. Each participant keeps his role during the whole experiment.
In each of the 40 rounds that you will play the central computer will choose your competitor randomly from the other other group of participants. Hence, it is very likely that you will not always play against the same participant.
Stage 1
Next, each player will be able to see (on his/her computer screen)
• which jobs belong to player 1 and which belong to player 2;
• the processing time of each job.
From this moment on each group plays 20 times the (same) game based on the situation displayed on the computer screen. Each time you have to decide which job(s) you want to send to machine M 1 and which job(s) you want to send to machine M 2 . After each of the 20 rounds we will show the decisions of both players, the processing of the jobs, the costs and your new (updated) wealth.
Stage 2
At the beginning of Stage 2 the jobs of the players are modified. Next, each player will be able to see (on his/her computer screen) the new situation, that is,
